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ABS1RACT 
Three mine explosions which occurred in the 1980s (1983 - McClure No. 1 Mine, Virginia; 1984 - Greenwich Collieries No. 
1 Mine, Pennsylvania; and 1989- Pyro No.9 Slope Williams Station Mine, Kentucky) cost twenty lives. The authors, by 
investigating these three cases, found a common ventilation problem. This problem was the misunderstanding of the diagonal 
connections in the mine ventilation system (MVS). 
Based on the findings from these investigations, the authors explain the importance of diagonal connections in a MVS 
and discuss other factors that affected safety. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The idea for this paper began almost 15 years ago, when the 
multidisciplinary BRASH (Behavioral Research Aspects of 
Safety and Health) research group at the University of Ken-
tucky led by H.P. Cole, designed and field tested a set of 
simulation exercises. These exercises both teach and test a 
variety of judgement, decision making, and problem solving 
skills required for coping with emergency conditions in 
underground coal mines. This research was supported by the 
U.S. Bureau of Mines contract H0348040 and with the assis-
tance of many persons and groups in the mining industry 
[Cole, et al., 1993]. The first author of this paper was asked, 
as a member of the BRASH group, to contrive a few mine 
ventilation simulation exercises. In 1985, when the prepara-
tion for the development of these exercises was taking place, 
the memory of the McClure Mine explosion ( 1983) and the 
Greenwich Collieries explosion was still fresh. The first 
author, being familiar with the cause of these disasters, de-
cided to use the McClure Mine explosion scenario as a basis 
for his simulation exercises, because this scenario depicted a 
typical problem associated with diagonal connections. Out of 
the 65 ventilation exercises developed by the BRASH group, 
one was designed in two alternate versions, the first version 
called the Delta Mine Cut-through exercise (DMC) and the 
second called the Cut-through Ventilation Arrangement 
exercise (CVA) (Wala and Cole, 1987). Both of these teaching 
and testing exercises are available from local MSHA offices. 
These ventilation exercises were used to test and teach a 
control group of personnel from various locations in the 
mining community, and performance data were gathered from 
this. This data were then analyzed and further tested; the 
results were published by Passaro, et al., in 1994. 
After the release of the 1990 Report of Investigation con-
cerning the 1989 Pyro No. 9 Slope William Station Mine 
explosion, the first author of this paper read the report and 
subsequently analyzed the ventilation system. The fmdings of 
his analysis are presented in this paper. 
DIAGONAL CONNECTIONS IN MINE VENTILATION 
Mine ventilation generally consists of an arrangement of 
multiple, interconnected airways, often creating a complicated 
MVS. A point where two or more airways intersect is called 
a junction or a node. Airways that connect these nodes are 
called branches. The sets of junctions and branches with their 
associated flows can be considered the mine ventilation 
network (MVN). If the branches are connected in series and/or 
parallel, the branches of such a system are called ordinary 
branches and the MVN is named a simple network. However, 
if there exists a branch that connects two points of different 
branches, then this branch is called a diagonal branch and the 
MVN is no longer a simple network. In this case it is called a 
complex network. 
The airflow through a diagonal branch can reverse, and 
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its direction depends on the resistances of the branches inter-
connected with it. Diagonal connections ahnost always exist 
in a MVS; however, good planning can decrease the total 
number of these branches. Usually it is not possible to elimi-
nate all of them, but it is important to recognize the problems 
associated with their existence and to pay attention to their 
effect on the MVS. 
STABILITY CONDITIONS FOR A COMPLEX MVN 
The stability of the flow through a diagonal connection is 
related to the resistance of the airways interconnected with the 
diagonal branch, as was mentioned above. These relationships, 
known by engineers as the basic ·Wheatstone Bridge (see 
Figure I) balance conditions for electrical circuits, they are 
displayed as follows; 














Figure 1. Wheatstone Bridge - electrical circuit. 
These Wheatstone Bridge balance conditions are relevant 
for the analysis of the ventilation network (circuit). Figure 2 
shows a line diagram of the ventilation system with aerody-
namic resistances comparable to the Wheatstone Bridge 
electrical resistances shown in Figure 1. 
Closer examination of Figure 2, which represents the 
ventilation arrangement around a newly developed longwall 
panel, shows that the resistances of the ordinary branches can 
vary. The mining process, control devices, roof falls, and 
mishandling of the ventilation controls can cause this variabil-
ity. As can be seen from the relations in Equations (1 ), (2), 
and (3), the resistance of the diagonal branch does not affect 
the airflow direction. However, its magnitude does influence 
the flow quantity through the diagonal branch. If a flow 
reversal occurs in the diagonal branch, there is some period of 
time where the flow is stagnant. If the changing resistances of 
the surrounding branches are slow, this situation could prevail 
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Figure 2. Line diagram of the ventilation system around a 
newly developed longwall panel. 
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
There are two scenarios where diagonal branches can ad-
versely affect the ventilation system. The first scenario is 
when a diagonal connection already exists in a system and a 
flow . reversal or a stagnation occurs due to the resistance 
changes around it. The second scenario is when a diagonal 
branch is added, which causes a flow redistribution in the 
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surrounding branches. 
However, existing diagonal branches can be useful during 
fire fighting or mine rescue operations. Contaminated air 
(mine fire gasses) may attempt to flow into the working areas, 
but by altering the flow direction in a diagonal branch, it is 
possible to deliver fresh air to areas where it is needed. 
GRAPHICAL DISPLAY OF A MVN 
Different graphical methods of drawing schematics have been 
used to represent MVNs. The most common method used in 
the United States is the line diagram, which usually mirrors 
the mine plan layout. Another method is the canonical dia-
gram or canonical graph, a noncalibrated topological image 
(graph) of a mine's ventilation system. The canonical diagram 
is used almost exclusively in Europe, especially in Poland 
after it was developed by Czeczott in 1925. This diagram is 
especially useful in studying and controlling flow distributions 
and when conducting rescue and fire fighting operations. 
By using the canonical diagram, it is easier to distinguish 
between ordinary and diagonal branches, which is an impor-
tant safety concern in underground mines. As mentioned 
before, this information is very useful when quick and proper 
decisions are needed during fire-fighting or rescue operations. 
Czeczott explained the possible dangers created by diagonal 
connections in an underground mine ventilation system, in his 




Figure 3. Canonical diagram that corresponds with the 
schematics shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
In 1956 Bystron developed a method for the graphical 
presentation of a mine ventilation schematic that distinguishes 
ordinary from diagonal air currents. Bystron's method uses 
straight lines to represent the diagonal branches and arcs to 
represent the normal branches and he also suggested a safety 
indicator, SI, for ventilation systems based on the number of 
ordinary branches and diagonal branches expressed as folM 
lows; 
SI = 0 I (0 +D) (4) 
where N is the number of ordinary branches, and D is the 
number of diagonal branches. Figure 3 shows the canonical 
diagram representing the schematic displayed in Figures 1 and 
2. Patigny and Jacques (1973) and Miekus (1975), using the 
graph theory, developed a method and algorithm for classify-
ing air currents. 
THREE EXPLOSIONS - DIAGONAL CONNECTIONS 
WERE THE REASON 
The following are three different case studies concerning 
explosions that occurred in U.S. underground coal mines in 
the 1980's. The underlying cause of these explosions, as 
interpreted by the authors, was not recognizing the diagonal 
connections and their possible effects on the ventilation 
system. The authors' interpretations are based on infonnation 
gathered from the three corresponding MSHA's Report of 
Investigation (U.S. Department of Labor, MSHA, 1983, 1984, 
and 1990). As a result of these explosions, twenty lives were 
lost. 
McClure Mine Disaster 
On June 21, 1983, an explosion claimed the lives of seven 
miners at the McClure No. 1 Mine of the Clinchfield Coal 
Company, Virginia. The reason for this explosion was a poor 
ventilation practice when connecting the two longwall devel-
opment sections, 1st Left and 2nd Left (see Figure 4). The 
underlying factor can be traced to the creation of a diagonal 
connection, formed by the cut-through, merging two mining 
sections to form the longwall setup rooms. 
Figure 4 shows a line diagram of the above described 
ventilation system. The air courses of the two sections, 
branches 2-4-7 and 2-3M5-6-7, were nearly identical in length 
and cross sectional area. Therefore, the frictional resistances 
of these two sections' airways were approximately equal, 
leading to an equal flow distribution between the sections. 
However, due to methane liberation along branches 3-5a-5, 
additional flow was needed for dilution. This goal was 
achieved by placing a regulator, it is Rr in Figure 4, in the 
return side of the 1st Left Section (branch 4-7). It resulted in 
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an airflow equal to 19,000 cfm in the 1st Left Section and 
40,000 cfm in the 2nd Left Section. When these two sections 
were connected by branch 4-5 (cut-through), the "third situa-
tion" described by Equation (3) was created, causing a flow 
redistribution in the surrounding branches. This cut-through 
was performed near the end of the 2nd shift and air readings 
were taken in each section return afterwards. These new 
measurements indicated that 16,000 cfm was flowing in the 
1st Left Section return and 43,000 cfm in the 2nd Left Section 
return. Based upon the readings taken prior to and following 
the cut-through, it was assumed that 3,000 cfm of air was 
flowing from node 4 to node 5, when in fact it was 23,000 
cfm. By a simple mathematical balance of the airflow in the 
branches, it can be found that only 20,000 cfm was flowing in 
the 2nd Left's intake (before it was 40,000 cfm) where the 
methane liberation problem existed. The section crew of the 
2nd Left Section went home, because their shift was over, 
without constructing a control to separate the two aircourses. 
They presumed there was no significant change in the flow 
distribution. The intake flow on the 2nd Left was insufficient 
to dilute the methane being liberated into branch 3-5a-5, and 
the methane was allowed to accumulate during the idle third 
shift period. The next day, the first shift crew arrived to the 
section, turned on the feeder, and ignited the explosive meth-
ane concentration in this area. The problem probably would 
have been found and corrected, if the ventilation change had 
been handled according to federal regulations. 
Figure 5 shows the canonical diagram of this ventilation 
system. The diagonal connection created by branch 4-5 is 
easily recognizable in this diagram. It can also be seen that 
there was another diagonal connection formed by branch 5a-5, 
but the airflow in this branch did not reverse and did not 
influence the redistribution of the air in the effected area. 
Greenwich Collieries Mine Disaster 
On February 16, 1984, a mine explosion at the Greenwich 
Collieries No. 1 Mine, Pennsylvania claimed the lives of three 
miners and severely burned four others. Again, this explosion 
can be linked to a diagonal connection. Figures 6 and 7 show 
the simplified line diagram and the canonical diagram of this 
mine ventilation arrangement, respectively. 
Originally, the in by longwall gob area was ventilated by 
the air current flowing through branches 3-9-11-12-13 (D-3 
Section to D-1 Section). Due to water accumulations behind 
the inby gob area, a pump was placed in branch 9-10. The 
same water accumulation started forming inby the D-5 active, 
retreat pillaring section. To reduce the water accumulation on 
the D-5 Section, a diagonal connection, branch 10-6, was 
created to allow the water to reach the D-3 pump in branch 9-
10. By making this connection, the airflows were redistributed 
in the surrounding branches creating the "third situation" 
described by Equation (3). The section foreman stated that 
immediately after completing the cut-through, the airflow 
direction was from D-3 Section to D-5 Section (node 10 to 
node 6) and that the air smelled "stale". This was the indica-
tion that the gob bleeder, branch 10-11, had reversed its flow 
direction, now from node II to node 10. A curtain was hung 
across the cut-through. The pump in branch 9 to I 0 was still 
in a fresh air current at this time, because the air direction in 
branches 3-9-10 was unaffected. Figure 8 shows the canonical 
diagram of this ventilation arrangement. 
Two months later, a second cut-through was made con-
necting nodes 9 and 5, and again the stale air was noticed. 
This indicated a flow reversal in branch 1 0-9, bringing the 
contaminated air from the bleeder over the pump. A curtain 
was placed in the opening, allowing leakage from D-3 to D-5. 
This curtain reduced the flow from nodes 1I to 10 to 9 allow-
ing for the methane to build up in this bleeder system. The 
direction of flow in branch 3-9 was not changed. 
A permanent stopping was then built over the branch 1 0-
6 cut-through. Figure 9 shows the canonical diagram of this 
arrangement. Due to problems with the water pump (branch 9-
1 0), a crew of three was sent to the pump location to repair it. 
The explosion was centered in the branch 9-10 area and was 
triggered by the battery-powered locomotive that was being 
used by this working crew. 
Pyro No. 9 Slope William Station Mine Disaster 
An explosion at the Pyro Mining Company's William 
Station Mine, Kentucky, occurred on September 13, 1989 on 
the longwall recovery area of Panel "0", claiming the lives of 
ten miners who were recovering longwall mining equipment. 
The official cause of death for all ten victims was smoke, soot, 
and/or toxic fume inhalation resulting from the explosion. The 
I990 MSHA accident report cited that one of the contributing 
factors was "the failure to recognize the sensitivity of the 
bleeder system and the effects of the numerous ventilation 
changes." The following interpretation of the events leading 
to the explosion will show that the "sensitivity" of this system 
can be traced to the numerous diagonal branches and their 
effects on the· ventilation system. 
Figures I 0 and 11 show the simplified line diagram and 
the canonical diagram, respectively, of the pertinent portion of 
the mine ventilation system. Originally the air was routed as 
required by the Approved Ventilation Plan. The intake air 
came up the headgate (branch 13-14) and split, where some of 
the air went inby the longwall in the bleeder branch 14-18, 
and the major portion went across the active face (branch 14-
15) and was regulated on the return side in branch 15-16. 
Subsequently the rest of the tailgate air flowed into the gob 
area from node 15 to node 19. A curtain was used in the 
headgate bleeder entry (branch 14-I8) to regulate its flow. The 
Panel "P" setup rooms (branch 20-21) and the 2nd Main North 
(by branches 4-20 and 5-21) were connected to the bleeder 
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system ofPanel "0", creating numerous diagonal connections, 
which are represented as straight line connections in Figure 
11. 
After the longwall fmished mining the panel, the regula-
tor was removed from branch 15-16. This caused the air to 
redistribute, and therefore the pre-existing diagonal branches 
21-18, 18-14 and 19-15 reversed their flow directions. Figure 
12 shows the canonical diagram representing this scenario. 
The branch 18-14 bleeder was now flowing toward the Panel 
"0" recovery face with an insufficient volume to dilute the 
methane concentrations being liberated from the gob. The 
explosion occurred around the node 14 location, or the head-
gate of this longwall. Branch 14-18 (headgate-inby) was the 
diagonal branch that caused the accident. Failure to accurately 
predict the behavior of the diagonal connections resulted in 
the explosion. 
CONCLUSION 
1. Diagonal connections almost always exist in a MVS; 
however, good planning can decrease the total number of 
these branches. Usually it is not possible to eliminate all 
of them, but it is important to recognize the problems as-
sociated with them and to pay attention to their effect on 
the MVS. 
2. Some diagonal connections are more stable than others. 
All of these connections need to be recognized, but spe-
cial attention needs to be paid to those that are sensitive 
to mining activities, which can effect their behavior. 
3. There are two scenarios where diagonal branches can 
adversely effect the ventilation system. The first scenario 
is when a diagonal connection already exists in a system 
and a flow reversal or stagnation occurs due to the resis-
tance changes around it, as in the Pyro Mining explosion. 
The second scenario is when a diagonal branch is added, 
which causes a flow redistribution in the surrounding 
branches, as in the McClure Mine and Greenwich Col-
lieries explosions. 
4. Existing diagonal branches can be useful during fire 
fighting or mine rescue operations. Contaminated air 
(mine fire gasses) may attempt to flow into the working 
areas, but by altering the flow direction in a diagonal 
branch, it is possible to deliver fresh air to areas where it 
is needed. 
5. Mining companies need to analyze their existing diagonal 
connections and consider how new diagonal connections 
will influence their ventilation system. 
6. Further research is needed in the development of mining 
maps or schematics that clearly show the existence of di-
agonal connections. 
7. Education and training are needed to teach mine person-
nel and people that are responsible for ventilation deci-
sions on how to recognize and minimize diagonal 
branches. 
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Figure 4. Line Diagram of the ventilation arrange around the 
McClure Mine longwall panel. 
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Figure 5. Canonical diagram (schematic) of the ventilation 
arrangement at the McClure Mine. 
5 
Figure 6. Simplified line diagram of the ventilation arrange-




Figure 7. Canonical schematic corresponding to Figure 6 
(before the diagonal connections were made). 
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Figure 8. Canonical diagram of the MVS after the comple-
tion of the first cut-through. 
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Figure 9. Canonical diagram of the MVS after the comple-
tion of the second cut-through. 
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Figure 10. Simplified line diagram of the ventilation at the 
Pyro No. 9- William Station Mine, before the longwall tail-
gate regulator was "cut out". 
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Figure 11. Canonical schematic corresponding with the 
ventilation system shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 12. Canonical schematic of the ventilation system 
around Panel "0" after the longwall tailgate regulator was 
"cut out". 
